I do want to take a moment to make a couple of disclaimers: first, I recognize that this isn't a argumentatively sound paper. I'm not a philosopher and all I've really accomplished is making a almost tautological inductive argument, though one that I think is difficult to refute. I also admit (though not to my professor) that I may have taken one of my source's arguments slightly out of context. If you're the kind of person to go and check my sources to weigh my arguments, you might find this to be true.
Second, this is what I would consider a rough draft. In my own perfect little world I would have all the time I'd need to work on a paper (which I'd probably take way too much advantage of) and hone this baby to perfection, but I don't feel like I was able to accomplish that, or at least meet my own level of standards, and that is why, if you're paying real close attention, my paper my not be completely sound. Basically, I wrote it and never looked back, hoping for the best lol. I chose to post it in its "finished" state--with only minor grammatical adjustments--because I felt that if I did decide to spruce it up it wouldn't be the original paper that I was proud of I would sacrifice some integrity in the process.
One last note, I address "Dr. Gurney" in both my introduction and my conclusion. Dr. Gurney is a professor here at Multnomah University and the person to whom this paper is directly addressing.
***
Adrian Henske
PHL 102
Philosophical Issue Paper
5/10/12
Why
I Don't Have To Write This Paper
What I am about to
propose to you, Dr. Gurney, is that the completion of this paper is completely
unnecessary and I have no obligation to write it. I cannot reason with any
amount of certainty that any consciousness other than my own exists, including
your own, and therefore your requirement for this assignment is [unnecessary]. There is no concrete
empirical evidence to prove your existence, and for all I know you are nothing
more than a manifestation of my own consciousness. Subsequently, this
assignment does not exist and I do not have to do it.
The reasoning
behind my position is that of solipsism. Theodore J. Everett states, "Solipsism
is the view that only myself, or my mind and its contents, is real. There are
no other minds; there is no external world at all--just me and my sensations,
plus their strictly internal relations" (213). I am the only one who can
think my thoughts. I am the only one who can feel my pain. These things are
personal and distinct to me; they are a mirror of my own consciousness and,
because I can experience them, I can validate my existence through them.
However, I cannot experience pain or thoughts of anyone else. People can tell me about their thoughts, or they
can relate their pain, but I cannot
experience it in a personal way like I do my own. Because I have "no
direct awareness of the mental states of others" I cannot be sure that
anything "exists apart from [my] own mind and mental states" (Craig).
However, Everett
uses the argument of "second-order induction" to try and validate the
consciousnesses of others without the presence of actual tangible evidence. "If,
for example, all... statements found in the Encyclopedia Britannica which
I have verified so far have turned out to be true, then I have inductive reason
to believe that all of the statements in that work are true. If I then discover
the statement, 'all ravens are black', in the same encyclopedia, I will have an
inductive reason to believe that this new statement is also true---hence, that
all ravens are black. This inference succeeds, even if I have never seen a
single raven myself--indeed, even if I am blind, and even if I do not know
exactly what a raven is. In this way, second-order induction can function as an
indirect means of confirming propositions which are otherwise unverifiable"
(214). Applied to the concept of solipsism, second-order induction would reason
that if someone were to tell me that I'm about to experience pain, and I do, I
can "discover in this way that certain other people are reliable sources
in general" (Everett, 215). Given their track record for reliability, if a
person were to assert that they indeed have consciousness, I would be inclined
to believe them.
Second-order
induction has a couple of significant flaws, though. First, it asserts validity
based on a sampling of reliable
sources. Just because someone has proven themselves to be accurate and honest a
number of times (even a high number), it does not guarantee perfect consistency, but only gives us a
high statistical probability of its success. If it were possible to measure
every assertion and action to ever exist, both past and future, of a particular
individual, then we could believe beyond a reasonable doubt in the trustworthiness
of that person. However, no such method of measurement exists, and besides, who
can honestly say they've ever encountered someone or something that carries
such an absolute level of consistency? To imbue a fallible human being with such
an unrealistic trait is absurd.
Even if I were to
accept the testimony of a person who claims to be "real" based on
their consistent reliability, there is a radical difference between my choice to do so and the actual
validation of their claim. If everyone I ever met told me that giraffes speak
fluent Chinese, I would have no initial reason to doubt them. Solipsism is not
a justification for skepticism for the sake of being a skeptic. Until am able
to observe whether or not a giraffe can indeed speak Chinese, and prove it
beyond a reasonable doubt (do all giraffes speak Chinese or only some?, etc.),
this claim remains unverified and cannot be accounted for with any degree of
certainty.
Next, in the
earlier example, second-order induction suggests that by a person stating to
possess traits that, so far, only you can claim to have—namely a tangible,
verifiable mind and consciousness—indicates that they arrived at the knowledge
of personal traits without prior consultation with you. In other words, if the
other person wasn't real, how could they possess knowledge and experience about
what it means to be real? By this logic, by possessing such information,
information that you, a thinking, verifiably real person also possess, and
arriving at said information separate from your own experiences, offers
validity for their testimony to their own existence.
But let me propose
an alternative scenario. What if, say, there is some higher source of knowledge
that is influencing your own mind and experiences. Everett concedes, "As
far as each of us can tell subjectively, after all, he might be a proverbial
brain in a vat, being fed his subjective experiences through a set of wires"
(213). Given this scenario, and if we continue to entertain the idea that we
are the only verifiable consciousness, then it not implausible to assume that
this other "person" is just a manifestation created by your
consciousness, and, because they exist solely in your mind, they share the same
knowledge and experiences that are being fed to you through these
"wires". This would account for their claim to share similar
experiences to your own, because, by extension, they are you. It is no less difficult to disprove this scenario than it
is to prove that the others around me are indeed real and tangible.
Christine M.
Korsgaard proposes the idea of "public reasoning" to refute the idea
of solipsism. The idea behind "public" reasoning is that we are
motivated beyond our own desires because we acknowledge, through the
interaction and consideration of others, that they indeed exist. Korsgaard's
argues that if it were true that we were the only consciousness, then we would
not bother to consider the wellbeing of others, since it would be irrelevant.
Because of their existence, we are prompted to interact accordingly (Korsgaard).
Public reasoning is basically a moral reasoning for the justification of other
minds. As Mary Clayton Coleman states,
citing Korsgaard, "...She argues that, given the practical identities
we happen to have chosen, some of our reasons happen to be public. For
example, given that I have chosen to be a teacher, that is, given that I have
chosen this identity, some of my students’ needs give me direct reasons to act"
(Coleman, 319). To elaborate, if I possess a desire that directly correlates to
someone else, say, as a teacher I choose to stay up late finishing tomorrow's
lesson, motivated more for the sake of my students' understanding than my own
body's desire to sleep (Coleman, 318) , then perhaps this suggests a validity
of the existence of my students. The success of this argument—whose goal is to
support the existence of additional consciousnesses—is dependent upon the other
mind (my students) initiating my desire for their wellbeing, thereby acting as
the catalyst for my concern for them. If this plays out appropriately, then I
will have reacted to something external to my own mind, and if I previously
held the view that I am the only consciousness, then I am in serious need of
reconsideration of my views since it seems unlikely that I would be compelled
to react to something that doesn't exist.
In a nutshell, Korsgaard
is arguing that the exterior consciousness, that is, the evidential
representation of an "other mind," precedes my decisions, thus
proving their existence. This argument sets out to answer the question,
"Which came first? The chicken or the egg?", though in this situation
it's trying to differentiate whose consciousness originated my moral obligation
to my students. Korsgaard claims that the responsibility lies with the
students, but I would argue otherwise. If
it had not been for my desire to become a teacher then I would never have a
need to be concerned for their wellbeing. Their existence, whether internal or external
to my consciousness, did not trigger me to become a teacher. My desire for
personal fulfillment (achieving my dream of teaching) was the first cause of
this situation, and had nothing to do with the individual students. The only
viable way my students could exist as an exterior consciousness is if they
initiated my desire for their wellbeing. However, my moral obligation to them
in no way proves their existence; it is merely a result of my own personal decisions, not one initiated by external
factors.
This entire
argument becomes a moot point when referenced, again, to the brain in a vat
scenario. Even if the students indeed initiated my desire to help them, it
doesn't guarantee their existence. It only states, matter-of-factly, my
capacity for selflessness, which is hardly related to a case for external
consciousnesses. For all I know, they too are manifestations of my mind, sent
to me as suggestions through the wires plugged into my brain, or, at the very
least, created within my mind.
In the end, there
is no concrete evidence to prove that any other mind exists other than my own,
and any attempt to refute solipsism only leaves me with vague probability and rough
speculation. By default, I see no other choice but to accept solipsism for what
it is: that I am the only verifiable consciousness and everything else is too
uncertain to warrant my undying belief. I can with no good conscience accept
that you, Dr. Gurney are real, and, by association, neither is this assignment.
As being such, I can see no mandate to complete it, nay, to even start it.
Oh... oh no... I went and wrote it, didn't I? Shoot...
Works
Cited
Bitbol, Michel. "The problem of other minds: A debate between Schrödinger
and Carnap."
Phenomenology
and the Cognitive Sciences 3. (2004): 115-123. Print.
Coleman, Mary Clayton. "Public Reasons and Practical Solipsism." The Southern
Journal of
Philosophy.
Vol. XLIII (2005): 317-336. Print.
Craig, Edward. "Solipsism."
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1998. Web.
Everett, Theodore J. "Other voices, other minds." Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 78.2 (2000): 213-222. Print.
Korsgaard, Christine M. The
Sources of Normativity. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press,
1996. Print.
Minar, Edward H. "Wittgenstein on the Metaphysics of the Self: The
Dialectic of Solipsism in
Philosophical Investigations" Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 79. (1998): 329–354. Print.
Putnam, Hillary. "Wittgenstein and Realism." International
Journal of Philosophical Studies
16.1 (2008): 3-16. Print.
